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Regional Policy in the European Community
What is known as the European Community's regional 
policy is a policy aimed at achieving a better territorial 
balance of economic development in Europe. The Community has 
been involved only very recently, and still very marginally 
with the fate of the region as institution; the EEC Treaty 
only acknowledges the existence of Member States and is 
basically indifferent to the internal division of powers of 
those states.
More balanced economic development means, in practice, that 
measures are taken in favour of the less-developed ter­
ritories of the European Community. Yet, there is a fundamen­
tal ambiguity about the definition of those territories. They 
could be defined as the least developed Member States or as 
the least developed sub-areas within those States. The EEC 
Treaty in its original form did not provide for a regional 
policy in either of those two forms. It did not, first of 
all, formulate a policy for allocating or redistributing 
resources among the Member States. The integration process 
was not seen as a zero-sum game; the general belief was 
rather that the establishment of the common market would 
provide benefits for all the national economies involved. 
Single aspects of the Treaty mechanism were thought to favour 
some Member States more than others, but the overall Treaty 
structure was thought to provide a fair deal to all.
As for the second aspect, the allocation of resources among 
sub-national units, it was only very indirectly mentioned in 
the EEC Treaty. One reason which is often given is that the 
founders of the Treaty were convinced that the "benefit for 
all" of open borders, promised by neo-classical economic 




























































































subnational units. One may wonder whether the drafters of the 
Treaty really had firm convictions in this sense. The more 
obvious reason for not incorporating regional development 
policy in the treaty system might have been that, whatever 
the spatial effects of market integration, the allocation of 
resources within the Member States was, and would remain the 
responsibility of their governments alone. Or rather, the 
role of Community law was defined in negative terms, as being 
to avoid that those national policies of regional development 
should distort competition within the common market (articles 
92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty) . But all other regional 
development decisions remained within the discretion of the 
Member States.
This original picture has changed considerably since. The 
European Regional Development Fund, created in 1975, is an 
ambiguous legal instrument which provides for a deliberate 
territorial policy in both senses. It has essentially been a 
mechanism for the reallocation of resources among the Member 
States but it took the form of a policy instrument aimed at 
the economic development of regions. This fundamental 
ambiguity about the real nature and objectives of the 
Community regional policy has been there since it started.
In common parlance and in budgetary terms, the Community 
regional policy has traditionally coincided with the rules on 
the operation of the European Regional Development Fund. Yet, 
other budgetary headings have also served to promote 
territorial balance within the Community (essentially the 
Social Fund and the Guidance Section of the Agricultural 
Fund, not to forget the financially separate role of the 
European Investment Bank), and all those instruments have now 
been coordinated by the global reform. in 1988. of the 
Structural Funds.
In the mean time, the objective of regional economic 
development has been incorporated in the EEC Treaty by the 
Single European Act. More generally speaking, the establish­




























































































periphery of the European Community has become in recent 
years a central policy objective of the European Community.
It is arguable- that regional development has now become 
more than a mere label covering a system for redistributing 
money among the Member-States of the European Community. 
Conditions are now attached to the allocation of Communty 
money, and the most recent reforms may have increased the 
power of the Commission to impose its policy priorities on 
the Member States. In addition, the Treaty rules on state aid 
(article 92 and following of the EEC Treaty) have increasing­
ly been used by the Commission to limit the autonomy of 
States in conducting their own regional policies. Taking into 
account those various developments, there may be more reason 
now to speak of a genuine Community regional policy, even if 
still strongly characterised by power sharing and coordina­
tion.
This sketchy outline of European Community regional 
policy will be developed somewhat in this paper, but special 
emphasis will go to the role played by the Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes (IMP’S) within this evolution. The 
paper is divided in three parts according to a chronological 
order: first, the evolution of Community regional policy 
before the institution of the IMP’s; then, the changes 
brought by the Mediterranean Programmes to the nature of 
Community regional policy; finally, the changes to Community 




























































































I. REGIONAL POLICY BEFORE THE MEDITERRANEAN PROGRAMMES
A. The Creation of the Regional Development Fund
In the decade and a half following the signature of the EEC 
Treaty, a number of intervening factors modified the initial 
position, described above, and saw the emergence both of 
regional development and of financial redistribution as 
Community issues. This led to the creation of the European 
Regional Development Fund in 1975, which can be considered as 
the formal start of a Community regional policy.
During the 1960's, regional development policies established 
themselves in the domestic systems of the Member States much 
more solidly than before. As explanations for this trend, one 
may think of developments in economic theory (with the 
general rejection of the neo-classical model of "automatic" 
geographical equilibrium through the operation of the market 
in favour of more interventionist models), but also in 
political ideology more generally (with the recognition of 
the right of every citizen to fair living conditions and 
equal welfare whatever the area of the country he happens to 
live in). But the establishment of the common market, during 
those years, may itself take some of the credit for the 
expansion of regional aid systems at the national level. 
Following the elimination of tariffs, export subsidies and 
quotas, Member States had to resort to alternative and more 
sophisticated protectionist measures that were not in such 
blatant violation of the EEC Treaty. Regional aid to 
industry, in particular, had the advantage of not only 
benefitting the regions concerned as compared to non-assisted 
areas within the country, but also as compared to competing 
firms in other Member States, and the latter effect may even 
be the more desirable for those granting the aid.




























































































disappear or decrease upon the establishment of the common 
market, as the neo-classical model promised. On the contrary, 
evidence produced by the Commission in 1971 showed that 
regional income disparities had globally increased in the 
first decade of existence of the European Community. The view 
gradually emerged that, among other causes for this deterior­
ation, the establishment of the common market itself may have 
been instrumental.
However, the politically decisive consideration in establish­
ing the Regional Development Fund was probably not the will 
to tackle the problem of regional imbalance at a European 
level, but rather the need to rearrange the financial 
benefits of membership of the European Community. The initial 
equilibrium of costs and gains between the original six 
Member States had to be revised in the late 60' s during the 
negotiations for the accession of new Member States. 
Particularly the United Kingdom insisted that the relative 
weight of agricultural expenditure in the EEC budget should 
be reduced by some new financial instrument in which the 
country would have a larger share. The idea of a regional 
development fund, cherished by the Commission, seemed an 
excellent candidate for that role.
Immediately before the accession of the three new 
members, at the Conference of Heads of State and Government 
of Paris in October 1972, it was agreed to create a European 
Regional Development Fund before the end of 1973. This Fund 
was finally established, after protracted negotiations, by 
EEC Regulation 724/75 of 18 March 1975.1 
The legal basis for this decision was found in article 235
1 On the many vicissitudes accompanying the creation of the 
Regional Fund, see, among many other authors, Helen Wallace, 
"The Establishment of the Regional Development Fund: Common 
Policy or Pork Barrel?", in H.Wallace, W.Wallace & C.Webb 
(eds). Policy Making in the European Community. London, 1st 
ed, 1977, 137-163; Umberto Leanza, "Osservazioni al progetto 
della politica regionale nella Comunità europea", in Saggi di 
diritto delle Comunità europee, Napoli, 1981, 351-369; 
Giuseppe Porro, "Politca regionale della CEE", Novissimo 




























































































of the EEC Treaty which empowers the Community to act, even 
in the absence of an explicit enabling provision in the 
Treaty, when such action is necessary "to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the 
objectives of the Community". In the present case, the 
objective to be attained was found in article 2 of the EEC 
Treaty which defines the Community's first task as being "to 
promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of 
economic activities". This legal construction stirred some 
controversy at the time, because it seemed doubtful whether 
this "gap-filling" clause of the Treaty could legitimate such 
a far-reaching policy decision.2 Yet, once the political 
decision to start the Fund had been made, the debate on the 
proper legal basis quickly subsided, and the controversy then 
shifted to the actual form and nature of the Fund.
B. The Early Operation of the Regional Development Fund
Problems of a quantitative nature have plagued the 
Fund's first years of operation. In the 1975 Regulation, the 
Council had fixed, as an essential part of the political 
compromise, the total amount to be spent on the Fund for the 
years 1975 to 1977. Since 1978, the European Parliament has 
used its important budgetary powers to fight for a steady 
increase in the Regional Fund, against the Council which was 
generally rather reluctant but in which some Member States - 
the Fund's main beneficiaries - acted as the Parliament's 
allies. The efforts of the Parliament have been relatively 
successful in raising the level of budget appropriations for 
the Fund over the years. It is now solidly established as the 
second most important item of Community expenditure, after
2 On the proper legal basis for establishing the Fund, see the 
contributions by Umberto Leanza, "Il ricorso all'art.235 del 
Trattato CEE in materia di politica regionale comunitaria", in 
Saggi di diritto delle Comunità europee, op.cit. 407-427; Michel 
Melchior, "Aspects juridiques de la politique régionale de la 
Communauté", in L'Europe et les régions. Liège & La Haye, 1975, 
23-126; Giuseppe Porro, "I fondamenti della politica regionale nel 






























































































Despite widespread misgivings about the quantitative 
inadequacy of the Fund compared to its ambitious goals, the 
main criticism, perhaps, was of a qualitative nature. The 
Fund was widely considered not to be a genuine regional 
policy at all, but rather a sophisticated mechanism of 
financial redistribution among the Member States.Such 
redistribution between richer and poorer States is perfectly 
legitimate, especially in a Community aspiring to some 
federal type of solidarity between its components. More 
specifically, it is a defensible view that the burden caused 
to a State by the implementation of a regional development 
policy should be partly borne by the other Member States. 
However, if this is the only policy objective, it can be 
achieved more easily by straightforward mechanisms of 
financial equalisation as exist in several federal states. It 
does not need the creation of a complicated grants-in-aid 
mechanism like the ERDF, which raises illusory expectations 
of a substantive regional development policy coordinated at 
the Community level.
The additional budgetary and bureaucratic cost involved 
in setting up a mechanism of conditional matching grants like 
the ERDF, compared to a simple system of direct and global 
disbursements to the Member States, would seem to be 
preferable only if such a mechanism had qualitative ad­
vantages outstripping its cost. This would be the case if the 
system allowed for the enforcement of Community priorities in 
regional development. The Community would then be able to 
direct overall spending on regional development towards 
instruments, areas and activities that are different from 
those which the Member States would have selected on their *
 ̂This crucial point is made in most of the earlier literature on 
the Fund. See, among others, P.S.R.F.Mathijsen, A Guide to 
European Community Law. London, 1980, p.181; Yves Meny, "Should 
the Community regional p>olicy be scrapped?", Common Market Law 
Review 1982, 373-388, p.377; J. van Doom, "European regional 
policy: an evaluation of recent developments", Journal of Common 





























































































This, however, was not the case under the original ERDF 
Regulation. The amount of the ERDF budget which was to be 
spent on the territory of each Member State did not result 
from the application of substantive Community policy criteria 
but was fixed at the outset in the form of a national "quota" 
attributing - as a right - a certain percentage of Regional 
Fund disbursements to each country,4 5 without any "floating" 
part whose allocation could be decided by those operating the 
Fund. But even within these national quotas, the scope for 
autonomous Community decision-making was almost nothing. 
The regions benefitting from Fund subsidies were exclusively 
those designated by each country for the purpose of its own 
regional development policy, either all or some of them;^ 
States had to draw up a regional development programme 
according to a scheme elaborated by the Commission within 
which they had to fit the single infrastructure or investment 
projects they proposed for funding by the Community.
What was left for the Commission was, first of all, the 
selection, among the individual projects submitted by the 
States, of those that were entitled to ERDF allocations on 
the basis of a number of criteria listed in Article 15 of the 
Regulation: contribution to the economic development of the 
region; consistency with Community programmes or objectives; 
the situation in the economic sector concerned and the 
profitability of the project; the frontier character of the 
project; other assistance granted by the Community institu­
tions or the European Investment Bank. Even this was often 
only a token power; by submitting a number of projects whose 
combined ERDF financing approximated the national quota,
4 The original quotas agreed upon in the 1975 Regulation were the 
following: Italy 40%, United Kingdom 28%, France 15%, Fed.Rep. of 
Germany 6.40%, Ireland 6%, Netherlands 1.70%, Belgium 1.50%, 
Denmark 1.30%, Luxemburg 0.10%.
5 Italy, for instance, decided to submit for ERDF funding only 
projects situated in the Mezzogiorno, to the exclusion of those 
areas of north and central Italy that were also covered by 




























































































governments could eliminate any scope for Commission 
discretionary choice. In 1980, for instance, only 143 out of 
3,252 applications were rejected by the Commission on 
substantive grounds.**
After approval of the single projects, no direct link 
was established between the Commission and the ultimate 
beneficiaries of those projects which would have allowed some 
influence on the spending of the Community money. Instead, 
the money was passed to the Member States' central authorit­
ies who could decide on whether and how to pass it on to 
their local authorities or to the enterprises executing the 
project. This last aspect of the Regional Fund procedure 
raises the major problem of additionality. Indeed, the 
assumption that the ERDF added a distinctive and decisive 
financial contribution to meritorious regional development 
projects existing at the national level, was seriously 
questionable. Even though the Preamble of the 1975 Regulation 
stated that "the Fund's assistance should not lead Member 
States to reduce their own regional development efforts but 
should complement these efforts". States were under no strict 
obligation of "additionality", and often seemed to consider 
the ERDF funds as a partial reimbursement of their own 
regional aid, rather than as an additional benefit for a 
given region or activity.6 7
6 Yves M6ny, "Should the Community regional policy be scrapped?", 
op.cit., p.378.
7 See Jan A.Winter, "The European Regional Development Fund and 
the principle of additionality", In order Liber Amicorum Pieter 




























































































C. Intermediate Reforms of Regional Policy (1979 and 1984)
An amendment to the Regulation in 1979,® adopted again after 
long discussion during which the Commission's initial 
proposals had been considerably watered down, showed a slight 
move towards a more genuine Community regional policy. Its 
major innovation was the creation of a small "quota free" 
section, five percent of the total ERDF budget which was not 
to be automatically distributed to the Member States, but 
would be used for specific Community action in response to 
specific Community needs. Further readjustments were made by 
an ambitious reform in 1984, which was intended as global and 
long-term but proved to be very provisional again.8 9
Briefly said, the overall result of this reform has been a, 
rather modest, limitation of the strong control which the 
national governments originally had on the operation of the 
Regional Development Fund. First of all, the quota system was 
replaced by a system of indicative ranges attributed to each 
country. This gave to the Commission some discretion in the 
selection of national schemes. The lower limits, to which 
each country is entitled, add up to 88.63% of the total 
budgetary allocation. Therefore, 11.37% remained to be 
distributed according to autonomous Community criteria.
In addition, the Commission received the power to 
initiate its own schemes. More attention was also given to 
the "field" by introducing the concept of "endogenous 
development" and making some timid moves toward the institu­
tional participation of local and regional authorities in the 
Fund mechanism. A general presentation of those reforms can
8 Council Regulation 214/79 of 6 February 1979, Official Journal 
1979, L 35.





























































































be found elsewhere.^ I will concentrate here on those 
aspects of the reforms which can be seen as foreshadowing the 
legal regime of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes.
* The Programme Approach
The 1979 reform provided for a small "quota-free" 
section of the Fund (amounting to 5%) to be used for specific 
Community actions. Such actions, however, took the legal form 
of Council Regulations adopted unanimously, a procedure which 
guaranteed national interests against too adventurous 
Commission initiatives in this field. Moreover, even if the 
initial move came from the Commission, specific actions 
needed to be implemented through single programmes submitted 
by each of the Member States covered by the action.
Under the new Regulation adopted in 1984, the Commission 
consolidated its power to initiate actions and the scope of 
the actions financed by the Fund now also became more varied. 
The operations benefitting from ERDF subsidies were no longer 
exclusively defined as "projects". Alongside those projects, 
the new legal figure of "programmes" was introduced, in two 
varieties: Community programmes and national programmes of 
Community interest.
The Community programmes were introduced in order to replace 
the specific Community actions of 1979, and were defined, in 
Article 7, as "series of consistent multiannual measures 
directly serving Community objectives and the implementation 
of Community policies". They do not depend in first instance
The most exhaustive study of the 1984 reform of the Regional 
Fund is that by Julian Currall, "Le Fonds européen de 
développement régional des origines jusqu'à l'Acte Unique 
Européen", Cahiers de droit européen 1988, 39-102. See also Bruno 
De Witte, "The Reform of the European Regional Development Fund", 
Common Market Law Review 1986, 419-440; H.W.Armstrong, "The Reform 
of the European Community Regional Policy", Journal of Common 
Market Studies 1985, 319-343; Senen Florensa Palau, "La politica 
regional de la CEE- fundamentos e instrumentaciôn", Revista de 




























































































on national initiatives or choices, but on autonomous policy 
choices at the Community level. This autonomous character is 
confirmed by the fact that such programmes "shall as a rule 
concern the territory of more than one Member State" (Article 
7 (2)), and that they can extend beyond the areas covered by 
the regional development policies of the States, if the 
latter agree (Article 9 (3)). The Community character is 
reinforced by one major change with regard to the specific 
actions: the framework of these programmes has no longer to
be adopted in the Council by a unanimous vote, but by a 
qualified majority (Article 7 (4)). The first two programmes 
of this kind which were adopted in 1986 were the STAR 
programme whose purpose is "to improve the access of the 
Community’s least-favoured regions to advanced telecommunica­
tion services", and the VALOREN programme designed "to 
exploit the indigenous energy potential of those regions".  ̂
Later they were followed by programmes for the economic 
conversion of areas hit by the crisis in steel (the RESIDER 
programme)^ and shipbuilding (RENAVAL programme).^
Community programmes were not, despite their name, exclusive­
ly controlled and operated by the Community institutions. 
Indeed, the Community participation was limited to a maximum 
of 55% of all public expenditure involved in the programme 
(Article 7 (4)). The mutual role and obligations of the
Community and the States and their respective interventions 
were laid down in a programme agreement (Article 13).
This contractual form arises from the fact that development 
programmes are more complex operations than the projects 
funded until then by the ERDF. It was thought that the 
agreements might ensure an optimal coordination of activities 
between the public authorities involved in the programme,
^  Council Regulations 3300/86 and 3301/86 of 27 October 1986, 
Official Journal 1986, L 305.
Council Regulation 328/88, Official Journal 1988, L 33.




























































































namely the Community and the Member St a t e . S u c h  agreements 
are also used for the second type of programmes, the national 
programmes of Community interest. Like with the projects 
under the original ERDF Regulation, the initiative here 
rests with the Member States, the Commission playing the more 
passive role of selection and adoption along the existing 
"ERDF committee" procedure outlined in Article 40. The 
distinguishing feature of these programmes, compared to the 
existing system, was therefore not that they allowed for more 
Commission discretion, but that they were formulated in more 
global terms. Indirectly, one hoped of course that the 
gradual substitution of individual projects with more 
comprehensive programmes would increase Community control on 
the use of the Fund and attenuate some of the shortcomings of 
the old system such as the lack of coordination, additional­
ity and visibility.
Alongside the programmes, the Member State could 
continue to apply for the funding of single projects like 
before. Indeed, this type of development assistance continued 
to be predominant. The share of ERDF aid allocated to 
programme financing had "as far as possible" to be gradually 
increased so as to reach at least 20% of the appropriations 
allocated by the ERDF at the end of the third year of 
operation of the new regime (Article 6).
* The Integrated Approach
Article 34 of the ERDF Regulation of 1984 held that "in 
the management of the ERDF’s resources, investments and 
measures ... which form part of an integrated development 
approach, for example, in the form of integrated operations 14
14 The model for this new legal instrument of Community law 
might have been the contrats de plan between State and 
Regions introduced shortly before in the French planification 
system by the Law of 29 July 1982. For an analysis of this 
instrument, see Jean Marie Pontier, "Les contrats de plan entre 





























































































or programmes, may be accorded a priority treatment". The 
second paragraph of the same article then defines an 
integrated development operation as "a coherent set of public 
and private measures and investments which have the following 
characteristics : (a) they relate to a limited geographical 
area affected by particularly serious problems involving, in 
particular, delayed development or industrial or urban 
decline and likely to affect the development of the region in 
question; (b) the Community, through the joint use of various 
structural financial instruments, and the national and local 
authorities in Member States contribute in a closely 
coordinated manner to their implementation".
In other words, what differentiates an "integrated" 
operation from an ordinary operation funded by the Community 
is the bundling of efforts of various actors and institutions 
for a single purpose so as to achieve a 'synergic effect', 
that is, producing greater results than would be obtained by 
carrying out the different measures separately, one after the 
other. Three forms of coordination are wanted: between 
private and public actors; within the public sector, between 
European, national, regional and local authorities; within 
the Community administration, between the various structural 
funds (that is, the ERDF but also the European Social Fund, 
and the Guidance section of the Agricultural Fund), and the 
Community financial instruments (the European Investment Bank 
essentially).^
The term "integrated" is also sometimes used in the more 
narrow context of the coordination of the various Community 
funds whose purpose is to achieve a structural change of part 
of the national or regional economies. Attempts in this *
■̂5 According to the Commission, in order to have an integrated 
operation, "at least two of the three major Community structural 
funds should be involved (...) together with at least one 
Community financial instrument" (Information Note from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Procedures 
and content for the implementation of an integrated approach, 




























































































direction had been made for a number of years. ̂  In 1977 
already, that is, almost immediately after the coming into 
operation of the Regional Development Fund, an internal Task 
Force was set up in the Commission for that purpose, which 
was later to become a separate Directorate General.
Two experimental integrated operations had been running 
for some time in Naples and Belfast. Those were not a priori 
the easiest places in which to try out this novel and rather 
complex approach, and it would seem from a recent report of 
the Court of Auditors that the ambitious objectives of those 
operations have never been attained.16 7 Despite those rather 
discouraging precedents, the Commission decided to emphasize 
more generally the need for an integrated approach in a 
Communication which it issued in 1983.
The ERDF reform of 1984, as was said before, included the 
rule that priority should be given to such integrated 
operations, but did not give further indications on how that 
priority would be implemented and how integrated operations 
would be elaborated in future. In order to streamline 
requests of Member States and to dissipate the confusion 
about the specific nature and requirements of such opera­
tions, the Commission adopted in 1986 an "information note" 
on its policy in the matter.1® This document is still the 
most authoritative account of what is meant by the notion of 
"integrated approach".
16 For an early account of the integrated approach, see Guido 
Bernardini, "Les opérations intégrées de développement 
communautaire", Revue du marché commun 1982, 265-271.
17 Special report on the integrated approach to Community 
financing of structural measures. Official Journal 1988, C 188/1.





























































































* Participation of Regional and Local Authorities
Both the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee, and also, to a lesser extent, the Commission, had 
expressed themselves in favour of a formal recognition of the 
role of regional and local authorities in the conduct of 
Community regional policy. The modest result of the 1984 
reform in this respect was that regional involvement was no 
longer ignored altogether. Instead, there are a number of 
exhortations to the Member States to allow for wider 
participation of regional and local authorities in some 
fields. With regard to the regional development programmes 
which the States have to submit to the Commission as their 
global policy document, "the regional authorities concerned 
shall be involved as far as possible in their preparation" 
(Article 2(3)(a)). Likewise, the Member States undertake "to 
support cooperation between the regional and local bodies 
involved" at the internal Community frontiers (Article 1(3)). 
But when one comes to the heart of the matter, the institu­
tional set-up of the Community's regional policy itself, no 
specific guarantees for regional involvement are provided.
The Regional Policy Committee, the general advisory body 
for the Community’s regional policy, had been set up under a 
separate Council decision which was not modified by the 1984 
reform and the Fund Committee participating in the procedure 
for approving projects and programmes was, like before, to 
"be composed of representatives of the Member States" 
(Article 39). The procedure through which Member States must 
submit their applications for ERDF projects was not modified 
either, but for the national programmes of Community interest 
it was specified that "the Member States concerned shall 
first draw up the programme in collaboration with the 
authorities or bodies concerned, within the limits laid down 
by national legislation" (article 11(1)). In other words, the 
participation of subnational authorities in the Community 
process is not guaranteed; it rather continues to depend on 




























































































Similarly bland expressions could be found in a Joint 
Statement by the Council, Commission and Parliament in which 
those three institutions "recognize the importance of a more 
effective relationship between the Commission of the European 
Communities and the regional or, where appropriate, local 
authorities, with due regard for the internal jurisdiction of 
the Member States and the provisions of Community law. This 
will enable the interests of the regions to be taken more 
fully into account when regional development programmes and 
intervention programmes are being drawn up".̂ -9
Yet, it would seem that the new approach to regional 
development promoted by the 1984 reform would make it 
increasingly counterproductive for governments to exclude 
subnational institutions from all participation. The emphasis 
on programmes instead of single projects requires some form 
of coordination on the territorial level. Also, it should not 
be forgotten that alongside the formal rules that tended to 
limit strictly the scope for participation of regional and 
local authorities, a practice had developed whereby informal 
meetings between Community officials and local authorities in 
the implementation of regional policy measures had become a 
routine matter.19 20
19 Official Journal 1985, C 72/59.
20 According to the Commission, during one single year of 
operation of the ERDF, "several hundred meetings with the 
authorities of the regions took place (...) both in Brussels and 




























































































II. THE INTEGRATED MEDITERRANEAN PROGRAMMES 
A. Origin and Purpose of the IMP'a
On 28 March 1983, 23 August 1983 and 3 November 1983, 
that is, even before the 1984 reform of the Regional 
Development Fund, the Commission submitted to the Council 
several proposals for the institution of what it called the 
integrated Mediterranean programmes. In June 1984, the 
European Council at Fontainebleau decided to launch the 
scheme by 1985. The Commission then submitted a new proposal 
for a Regulation.
After a new period of tergiversations, in which it 
seemed that many Member States were only too willing to 
shelve the whole idea of the Mediterranean programmes, the 
decisive political breakthrough was made when Greece 
threatened, at the Dublin Summit of December 1984, <to veto 
the new Southern enlargement of the Community until such time 
as it received a formal guarantee from its Community partners 
that the integrated Mediterranean programmes would be 
launched. Agreement on the main terms of the scheme was 
reached at the next meeting of the European Council in 
Brussels, on 30 March 1985. In April, the Commission 
submitted a revised proposal in which it had drastically 
lowered its initial financial target, and this proposal was 
finally implemented, with only minor changes, as Council 
Regulation 2088/85 of 23 July 1985.
It thus took a very long time before the Mediterranean 
Programmes were adopted. In the mean time, there had been *
^  Official Journal 1985, L 197. The final adoption of the 
Regulation was preceded by a concertation meeting between 
Council and Parliament which produced some minor changes to the 
Council’s original draft; see W.Nicoll, "La procédure de 
concertation entre le Parlement européen et le Conseil", Revue du 




























































































several shifts in the political perception of those program­
mes. At first, they were seen as an instrument for tackling 
the structural economic problems of the whole Mediterranean 
region of the Community.22 Greek accession, and the Greek 
memorandum of 19 March 1982 in which that country's govern­
ment stressed the need for a special effort of solidarity 
from the side of its new partners, gave a new sense of 
urgency to this commitment. Negotiations on accession of 
Spain and Portugal then turned it into a convenient gesture 
towards those countries and regions who had most to fear from 
the imminent competition of the newly acceding economies, 
namely Greece, Italy and southern France. In the final 
months, the IMP'S became once again a very "Greek" dossier; 
while France and Italy were also among the future beneficiar­
ies, they certainly did not exert as much political pressure 
to push the project through.
All this confirms the view that the main "raison d ’être" 
of the IMP ' s was not so much the economic development of 
geographically defined areas with common problems,23 but 
rather to organise a new operation of financial redistribu­
tion among the Member States comparable to the creation of 
the Regional Development Fund after the first enlargement of 
the Community.
Given this background, the IMP scheme was obviously not 
extended to Spain and Portugal upon their accession but 
remained limited to the three original Mediterranean members 
of the Community, despite the "objective" fact that the 
structural economic problems of many Spanish and Portuguese
22 on the early ideas and proposals, see Henri Bourgeau, 
"Programmes Méditerranéens Intégrés: un défi pour la 
Communauté", Revue du Marché Commun 1983, 451-456; 
Jeronimo Blasco Jauregui, "Los Programas Mediterraneos 
Integrados: una respuesta a la Europa del Sur", Revista de 
Instituciones Europeas 1985, n.l, 109-136.
23 Although this aspect is certainly present as well. It is 
emphasized in the analysis by George K. Yannopoulos, "The 
Management of Trade-Induced Structural Adjustment: An 
Evaluation of the EC’s Integrated Mediterranean Programmes", 




























































































regions are very similar indeed.
B. The Relation between the IMP’S and the Community's 
Regional Policy
In assessing to what extent the legal regime of the 
IMP'S modified the existing mode of operation of the 
Community regional policy, one should be aware of the fact 
that, although the IMP Regulation was adopted one year after 
the reform of the Regional Fund which was described in the 
preceding section, the Commission proposals had been on the 
table already for several years, so that one should speak of 
two parallel rather than subsequent legal regimes. Some of 
the original features of the Integrated Mediterranean 
Programmes were simply features which the Commission had 
proposed for general adoption in the framework of the ERDF, 
but which had then be turned down. The more limited scope of 
the IMP'S, and the more dynamic political climate of 1985 
(the year of the White paper on the internal market and the 
intergovernmental conference leading to the adoption of the 
Single European Act) allowed some innovations that had been 
rejected by the Member States only one year before.
Some of the specific characteristics of the IMP'S can be 
found in their denomination: they take the form of develop­
ment programmes covering entire regions and proceed through 
an integrated approach. Other institutional innovations are 
the important role recognised to the Commission and the 
opening towards the regional and local authorities.
* The Integrated Approach
The IMP scheme was instituted for seven years with a 
global budget of 6.6 billion ECU, 2.5 billion in the form of 
loans from the European Investment Bank and 4.1 billion in 
the form of aids from the Community budget, of which 1.6 




























































































produced from the three existing structural funds (Regional 
Fund, Social Fund and Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance 
Fund). This financial outfit already indicates that the IMP'S 
do not constitute an entirely new instrument of Community 
law, but that they avail themselves of the contribution of 
existing instruments acting in coordination with each other.
Therefore, although the IMP'S are similar to the 
Regional Development Fund both by their objectives (financial 
redistribution in the form of regional development program­
mes) and by their basic instruments (conditional grants-in- 
-aid, signing of a "programme contract" between the par­
ticipating institutions), they do not constitute a mere 
satellite of that Fund. They are rather intended to combine 
the efforts of the Regional Fund with those of the other 
structural funds, and Regulation 2088/85 is therefore based 
on three different articles of the EEC Treaty: article 235 
(the legal basis of the ERDF), article 43 (agricultural 
policy) and article 127 (operation of the Social Fund). Even 
when using ERDF money, the Mediterranean Programmes are 
implemented according to their own rules, which are different 
on such matters as geographical scope (a specific set of 
regions in Greece, Italy and France defined in Annex I to the 
Regulation), the type of operations (the emphasis is on the 
improvement of agricultural structures, and the creation of 
non- agricultural activities; see Annex II of the Regulation) 
and the rate of assistance (which may in certain cases go up 
to 70% of the total cost of the individual operation and even 
more for infrastructure projects of special interest 
presented by Greece: Article 13 of the Regulation).
* The Programme Approach
The target of the Community action instituted by the 
1985 Regulation are not single projects in specific localiti­
es, but a set of numerous, and purportedly consistent, 




























































































region. A separate programme is adopted for each of those 
regions, and is based on an inventory of the measures needed 
for the structural adjustment of the region. As those regions 
are similarly situated (they are all "Mediterranean"), they 
often have similar economic problems, and the remedies 
proposed in the various development programmes are therefore 
also rather similar. Yet, at the same time, an effort is made 
to identify the specific needs and specific assets of each 
region.
Because they concern one specific region, the IMP'S 
cannot be compared with the Community programmes under the 
ERDF Regulation (these always applied to more than one Member 
State and were defined on a sectoral basis). A better 
parallel can be made with the national programmes of 
Community interest under that same Regulation. The latter 
programmes, however, usually covered a smaller area than that 
of a region and the initiative for proposing them lay, as the 
name indicates, with the Member States rather than with the 
Commission.
* The Commission's Role
The role of the Council of Ministers ended with the 
adoption of the framework Regulation in 1985. The single 
programmes for each region, like national programmes of 
Community interest under the ERDF Regulation, but unlike 
Community programmes under the same Regulation, are adopted 
by the Commission, albeit after consideration of the opinion 
of an Advisory Committee on IMP'S in which the Member States 
are represented.24 Yet, the role of the Commission is not 
limited to the decision-making phase; indeed, one of the main 
novelties of the Regulation is the recognition of the 
Commission's role in the elaboration and implementation of 
the programmes.
24 See the details of this procedure in Article 7 of the 




























































































At the stage of elaboration. the Commission does no 
longer have to wait passively for ready-made proposals of the 
Member-States which it can either accept (usually) or reject 
(exceptionally). The Commission is now formally given a right 
to assist in the preparation of the programmes and to 
establish an ongoing negotiation process (Article 5 of the 
Regulation).
At the implementation stage, the Commission is even more 
present. While under the ERDF regime, the Commission was 
almost powerless once it had attributed the funds and did not 
always have an adequate view of what actually happened with 
the money, the IMP Regulation provides for its formal 
presence during the implementation of the programme through 
the Monitoring Committee (article 9 of the Regulation). In 
this committee, the Commission also establishes, for the 
first time in Community law, formal day-to-day contacts with 
regions or local authorities.
* Participation of Regional and Local Authorities
Article 5(2) of the IMP Regulation holds that "IMP'S shall be 
drawn up at the relevant geographical level by the regional 
authorities or other authorities designated by each Member 
State concerned." This provision constitutes an interesting 
semantic shift compared to the ERDF Regulation of 1984. 
Regions are now presented as the authorities that, normally 
speaking, will prepare the programmes. The reference to the 
"other authorities" would seem to be meant for a country like 
Greece where no regional authorities exist. Yet, Italy has 
read in those words a general possibility to attribute a 
decisive role to the central State authorities; indeed, the 
Italian government decided that it should have a more 




























































































in the elaboration of "ordinary" development plans of the 
25regions.
At the stage of adoption, both the French and Italian regions 
have been recognised as co-signatories of the programme 
contract, according to article 9 of the Regulation. Finally, 
regional and local authorities obviously play a major role in 
the implementation of the Programmes; they are also represen­
ted in the Monitoring Committees whose function and composi­
tion is set out in each of the programme contracts. 25
25 This decision of the government was challenged by some 
regions before the Italian Constitutional Court. The Court held, 
wrongly to my mind, that the IMP Regulation imposed such a 
modification of the internal division of powers to the detriment 
of the Regions (Constitutional Court, judgment n.399 of 11 
November 1987, Giurisprudenza Costituzionale 1987, I, 2807). 
Perhaps the IMP Regulation might allow such a modification, 




























































































III. REGIONAL POLICY AFTER THE MEDITERRANEAN PROGRAMMES
A. The Single European Act and the Reform of the Structural 
Funds
* Economic Cohesion and Regional Policy in the Single 
European Act
The signature of the Single European Act in February 
1986, and its coming into force in July 1987, did not bring 
any immediate changes to the operation of the Regional Fund, 
but they prompted a reconsideration of the function and legal 
status of the Community regional policy. Article 23 of the 
Single European Act has inserted a new Title V into the Third 
Part of the EEC Treaty, which consists of five articles : 
130a to 130e. The first effect of this reform is to insert 
regional policy explicitly within the EEC Treaty, thus 
correcting the awkward situation of a Community policy which 
is second in importance in budgetary terms, but was linked to 
the Community's constitutional document only through the 
tenuous link of article 235.
At the same time, the Single European Act codifies the main 
principles of Community regional policy. Article 130a of the 
Treaty unambiguously states that "the Community shall aim at 
reducing disparities between the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least-favoured regions". Regional 
development is thus recognised as a separate Community 
objective. But this does not mean that the Community may 
freely decide upon the instruments and measures for the 
pursuit of the objective. Indeed, article 130b immediately 
adds that the prime responsibility for attaining the 
objective lies with the Member States in the conduct of their 
economic policies, and that the task of the Community is 
(only) to "support the achievement of these objectives" 




























































































Of those structural funds, the only one which was not 
yet included in the Treaty was the Regional Development Fund. 
It is now mentioned in article 130c, and its purppse is 
officially stated to be : "to help redress the principal 
regional imbalances in the Community through participating in 
the development and structural adjustment of regions whose 
development is lagging and in the reconversion of declining 
industrial regions".
In operational terms, the main provision is article 130d 
which holds that upon entry into force of the Single European 
Act, the Commission has to submit a comprehensive proposal to 
the Council for the amendment of the rules of the three 
Structural Funds. The objectives of this global reform are 
spelled out in the Treaty text itself : "to clarify and 
rationalize their tasks in order to contribute to the 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 130a and 
Article 130c, to increase their efficiency and to coordinate 
their activities between themselves and with the operations 
of the existing financial instruments." The last phrase, 
finally, provides that the Council shall act unanimously on 
this proposal within a period of one year.
The objectives listed in the Treaty are enlightening. The 
object of the reform of the structural funds is not to bring 
any fundamental modifications to the substantive policies 
pursued through those funds, but to coordinate and stengthen 
their operation. This would seem to confirm the view that the 
effect of the Single European Act is to codify Community 
regional policy as it had developed rather than to establish 
new priorities. Yet, this codification also indicates an 
upgrading of regional development policy to one of the 
central policies of the Community.
Economic and social cohesion is presented in the revised EEC 
Treaty as just another policy of the Community.26 Yet, it has 
come to be considered by many as the second pillar of the
26 "Economic and social cohesion" is one of the seven Titles of 





























































































Single European Act, acting as a counterpart to the es­
tablishment of the internal market by 1993. The Commission,27 
the European Parliament28 * and several Member States2  ̂ insist 
on the intimate link between the establishment of the 
internal market and cohesion. The problem of the centre—  
periphery divide has undoubtedly moved to the top of the 
Community agenda. In many quarters, the main counterbalance 
to market integration is sought, not in substantive regula­
tion by the Community, but in a policy of territorial balance 
under the guidance of the Community. The new, and relatively 
effective, compromise which underlies the present dynamic 
trend of European integration seems to be that the States 
with weaker economies accept to move forward with market 
integration, in return for additional financial investment 
in regional development by those other Member States who are 
expected to benefit most from the open borders.
But the legal character of those two political objec­
tives is rather different. While it is possible to establish, 
within a given period of time, the legal framework of an 
economic area without borders, social-economic cohesion 
cannot be simply brought about by legal regulation. It is a 
slow, and continuous process, and the claim that this 
cohesion should be attained by 1993, when open borders have 
become a reality, is untenable. Yet, one of the recurring 
issues in recent years is whether the two endeavours - 
internal market and cohesion - keep step.
* The 1988 Reform of the Structural Funds
^7 See Making a success of the Single Act - A new frontier for 
Europe. COM(87) 100.
28 See its Report on economic and social cohesion in the 
Community (rapporteur Mr Rui Amaral), European Parliament 
Documents A 2-307/88 of 9 December 1988.
2  ̂See, for instance, the position taken by the Spanish Prime 
Minister, Felipe Gonzâlez, L'Europe de la Communauté des douze à 
l'Union européenne: objectif 1992. Deuxième Conférence Jean 




























































































On 31 July 1987, the Commission submitted its "comprehensive 
proposal pursuant to Article 130d" on the reform of the 
structural funds.30 The first proposal, or request, of the 
Commission in this document was that the budgetary allocation 
to the structural funds should be doubled in real terms by 
the year 1992. Indeed, despite the constant increase of their 
part within the European Community budget, the structural 
funds appeared to the Commission as hopelessly insufficient 
from the quantitative point of view. A number of current 
developments confirmed this insufficiency : regional 
disparities, far from decreasing, had become more important 
ever since the year 1974, as was documented in a Commission 
study.31 The enlargement of the EEC to Spain and Portugal had 
further increased the dimension of the regional problem 
within the Community. Finally, the completion of a genuine 
internal market was expected to widen even further the 
"natural" gap between dynamic and backward or declining 
regions. As a conclusion, if the ERDF had to make a real 
impact on regional development, its means had to be con­
siderably stocked up.32 The Commission therefore proposed 
that the process of completion of the internal market should 
be accompanied by a parallel expansion of budgetary credits 
for the structural funds, resulting in a doubling, in real 
terms, of the allocation to those Funds by 1992. This
30 COM(87) 376; see Official Journal 1987, C 245. An amended 
proposal was submitted on 23 March 1988: COM(88) 144.
31 The Regions of the Enlarged Community. Third Periodic Report 
on the Social and Economic Situation and Development of the 
Regions of the Community, Commission of the European Communities, 
1987, p.55 ff.
32 The discrepancy between the size of the problem and the size 
of the available means is indicated by the following statement in 
the Commission's Eleventh ERDF Report. 1985. p.4 : "the 
Community's ten weakest regions have, since the inception of the 
ERDF, received Fund assistance averaging 17 ECU a year per 
inhabitant. However, the gap in per capita GDP between the ten 





























































































proposal, as part of the global "Delors package",33 was fully 
and fairly rapidly endorsed by a decision of the European 
Council in February 1988.34 35*
The qualitative side of the Commission’s proposal, 
which entailed a complete change in the mode of operation of 
the various structural funds, was a much more complex matter. 
Still, the approval by the Council came, to the surprise of 
many, within the deadline imposed by art.l30d of the Treaty, 
in the form of the so-called "framework Regulation" 2052/88 
of 24 June 1988.33 The principles established in that 
Regulation were further elaborated in no less than four other 
Regulations, all adopted on 19 December 1988.3  ̂ In a much 
shorter time than in earlier occasions, the Member States 
agreed on what is undoubtedly the most drastic change in the 
Community's regional policy since the beginning.37 This is 
even more striking when compared to the slow and painful 
process of adoption of the Mediterranean Programmes, only a 
few years earlier.
Article 1 of the framework Regulation 2052/88 
attributes six overall objectives to the Structural Funds. In
33 Called after President Delors of the Commission who exposed the 
whole package in a document called "Making a Success of the Single 
Act", COM (87)100 of 15 February 1987.
34 The consequences of this decision for the budgetary procedure 
are drawn by the Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary 
Discipline and Improvement of Budgetary Procedure, Official 
Journal 1988, L 184/33, point 17. For details on how this 
"doubling" of the allocation to the structural funds is planned to 
take place over the years, see Jean Van Ginderachter, "La réforme 
des Fonds structurels", Revue du marché commun 1989, 271-279, at 
272 ff.
35 Official Journal 1988, L 185/9.
3^ Regulation 4253/88 (coordination between Funds), 4254/88 
(Regional Fund), 4255/88 (Social Fund) and 4256/88 (Agricultural 
Fund), all published in Official Journal 1988, L 374.
37 The literature on the 1988 reforms is still rather 
limited; in addition to J.Van Ginderachter, op.cit., see Jean 
Claude Séché, "La nouvelle réglementation des fonds 




























































































fact, they are little more than the juxtaposition of the 
previously separate objectives of each of the Funds. Three of 
those can be considered as objectives of territorial 
development, namely Objective 1 : "promoting the development 
and structural adjustment of the regions whose development is 
lagging behind"; Objective 2 : "converting the regions, 
frontier regions or parts of regions (including employment 
areas and urban communities) seriously affected by industrial 
decline"; and Objective 5 (b) : "promoting the development of 
rural areas".
The other three priority objectives are those of 
combating long-term unemployment, facilitating the occupa­
tional integration of young people and speeding up the 
adjustment of agricultural structures. They do not have a 
territorial bias in their formulation, which does not mean 
that the territorial dimension will be entirely absent from 
their implementation or their effective impact.
Each of the Structural Funds is called to contribute to the 
objectives of territorial development in its own way. Yet, 
the main role is of course attributed to the Regional 
Development Fund. Article 3 of the Regulation makes a 
distinction between Objectives 1 and 2, support of which is 
"the essential task" of the ERDF, and Objective 5 (b), 
support for which only comes in addition. A further ranking 
order is indicated by Article 12 (5) which holds that "the 
ERDF may devote approximately 80% of its appropriations to 
Objective 1". This is an elegant solution to the conflict 
which existed, at the time of drafting the 1984 Regulation, 
between the Commission's wish to concentrate all the ERDF’s 
funds on a number of priority regions, and the Council's 
insistence to retain all Member States as beneficiaries. The 
main part of the ERDF’s budget will henceforth be channeled 
to a limited number of regions in a limited number of Member 
States, under the heading of Objective 1, and a smaller part 
may continue to go to other regions and other Member States 
under the heading either of Objective 2 or Objective 5 (b). 




























































































itself in annex to the framework Regulation, which gives an 
indication of the political sensitivity of the issue. This 
list is of course very different from the list of IMP 
regions. The whole of Portugal, Ireland, Northen Ireland and 
large parts of Spain are among the priority areas under 
Objective 1. Moreover, not all the IMP regions of Italy are 
included in the list (only those situated in the Mezzogiorno) 
and only one of the French IMP regions, namely Corsica. The 
lack of correspondence between the list of new priority 
regions and the list of IMP regions confirms the view that 
the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes had been inspired 
less by the objective of territorial development than by the 
need to provide a financial bonus to specific Member States.
B. Relation with the IMP'S : Continuity and Discontinuity
The IMP Regulation had been adopted three years before 
the global reform of the structural funds. Yet, the practical 
experience with the IMP'S has not exerted a major influence 
on this reform. Some of the last IMP'S have only been adopted 
in 1988, and even those adopted earlier on had not yet shown 
a consistent pattern of implementation. Nevertheless, many of 
the concepts and ideas included in the IMP Regulation are 
also present in the new Fund Regulations. It is a curious 
fact therefore that the Commission, in its proposals for 
reform of the structural funds, did not once mention the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes.®®
Three major aims could be discovered in the 
original Commission's proposal of reform of the structural 
funds: (a) spatial concentration of the ERDF, but also of the 
other Funds on a selected number of regions, (b) increased
®® See the Commission Communication of 31 July 1987 on Reform of 




























































































efficiency by emphasizing the programme approach, the 
combined use of the various Funds (what the Commission calls 
"synergy") and continuous monitoring and assessment of the 
actions, and finally (c) an underlying implicit aim of 
increasing the role of the Commission which instead of a 
financial institution would become more like a regional 
development agency whose tasks would extend to the concep­
tion, the setting of prorities, the planning of interventions 
and the offering of technical support.
None of those aims were entirely new; indeed, they had 
been experimented to a certain extent in the legal regime of 
the Mediterranean Programmes. Spatial concentration had been 
on the Commission agenda for a number of years and had only 
very partially been effected by the 1984 reform. The 
efficiency aim had inspired the move towards programmes and 
the experiments with the integrated approach which charac­
terised the Mediterranean Programmes. The vision of the 
Commission as a development agency can be found already in a 
Commission Communication of 1981 and had also been realised 
to a certain extent in the institutional set up of the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes. But all those strands of 
Commission (and Parliament) thinking were now brought 
together in a single ambitious document.
A full examination of all the novelties brought by the 
reform of the structural funds cannot be attempted here. I 
will rather limit myself, in the following pages, to a brief 
examination of the degree to which the typical features of 
the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, as they were 
outlined in the preceding section, have also been adopted in 
the new legal regime of the structural funds.39
39 It may be emphasized, to avoid misunderstanding, that the 
Regulation on the IMP'S has not been modified by the reform of 
the structural funds, so that the IMP'S continue to be implemented 





























































































The integrated approach adopted in an experimental way 
in the legal regime of the IMP'S is now given full recogni­
tion in the global reform of the structural funds.40 However, 
the early experience with the IMP'S has shown that a genuine 
coordination between different structural funds, all 
functioning according to their own rules, is not easy to 
achieve. The programmes, and single projects within those 
programmes, may well receive money from various Community 
sources, but this usually constitutes a simple addition of 
grants without the famous "synergy" promised by the new 
strategy.
In order to obviate some of those problems in the global 
reform, the so-called "horizontal Regulation" nr 4253/88 
imposes certain constraints on the operation of each of the 
funds which should lead to a better division of labour 
between them. It is however too early still to judge whether 
coordination will effectively improve under this regime. If 
it does, there may also be an indirect benefit for the way in 
which the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes will be 
implemented in future.
Apart from this global coordination, single operational 
programmes may also be implemented according to the in­
tegrated approach. This is not mandatory as with the IMP’S; 
operational programmes can still be funded and run by the 
Regional Development Fund alone. Indeed, there is not much 
incentive to take the trouble of establishing an integrated 
operational programme. In article 13(2) of the "horizontal" 
Regulation, it is simply said that "the desirability of 
implementing measures on the basis of an integrated approach 
shall be considered when establishing or reviewing a 
Community support framework." Perhaps the rather disappoint­
40 This experimental role of the IMP’S is emphasized by 
K.J.M. Mortelmans, "Effectiviteit en billijkheid: de GMP’s, de 
GAP's en de hervorming van de Europese structuurfondsen", 




























































































ing experience in some of the IMP'S has caused this lack of 
enthusiasm for enforcing the integrated approach across the 
board.
* Programme Character
Like the integrated approach, the programme character of 
the new regime is also situated at two levels. At the lower 
level, operational programmes remain, like before, one of the 
forms of assistance financed by the Regional Fund. But at the 
same time, the programme structure becomes the overall 
characteristic of the mode of operation of the structural 
funds.
Whereas Member States could previously submit ready­
made projects, leaving to the Commission only the decision 
whether or not to finance them, every development operation 
now has to fit in a general plan, elaborated together with 
the Commission and which is approved by the latter in the 
form of a Community support framework.41 Only after this 
basic document has been approved, the Member States may claim 
financial assistance which can take various forms: the 
existing forms of a project or an operational programme (the 
latter, as before, on the initiative of the Member State or 
of the Commission) and two new forms: part-financing of a 
national aid scheme or the provision of a global grant to an 
intermediary institution (usually a regional development 
agency ).* 4  ̂ It remains to be seen whether this heavy ad­
ministrative structure will lead to more coherent and 
effective policies, or whether those global plans and support 
framework will, like many of the earlier programmes, remain 
enumerations of unconnected single projects.
41 On the "plan", see Article 5 and following of Regulation 
4253/88; on the "support framework" see Article 8 and following of 
the same Regulation.
42 F0r the various forms of assistance, see (generally) Article 5 
of Regulation 2052/88 and (with specific reference to the Regional 




























































































A major discontinuity with the IMP'S (and, indeed, with 
the earlier regime of the Regional Fund) is that the 
instrument of the programme agreement disappears. The 
experience under the IMP regulation and the 1984 ERDF 
Regulation has shown that the drafting of those agreements 
often takes a very long time and does not noticeably improve 
the efficiency at the implementation stage. The 1988 reverts 
to the old formula of a unilateral decision of the Commission 
fixing the Community support framework.
The emphasis on interinstitutional cooperation, which used to 
be symbolised by the programme agreement, is not dropped 
altogether. It rather takes the more diffuse form of a 
"partnership'’ which should, from now on, characterise the 
whole process of preparation and of implementation of this 
Commission decision.
* Partnership
This has been introduced as a new concept by the 1988 
reform,43 but it corresponds to an old need, that of ensuring 
a close coordination between the various public authorities 
involved in a regional development operation, namely the 
Commission, the Member State and any number of subnational 
authorities within that State. Partnership is defined, in 
article 4(1) of the Regulation, as "close consultations 
between the Commission, the Member State concerned and the 
competent authorities designated by the latter at national, 
regional, local or other level, with each party acting as a 
partner in pursuit of a common goal".
This formula implies that there is no direct right for
43 See Article 4 of Regulation 2052/88. The concept probably 
stems from the United States, where it is used in the theory of 
federalism. See Daniel J.Elazar & Ilan Greilsammer, "The U.S.A. 
and Europe Compared - A Political Science Perspective", in 
Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler (eds), Integration Through Law. 
Europe and the American Federal Experience. Berlin, De Gruyter, 




























































































regional or local authorities to participate in the decision­
making process; the European Parliament had asked that the 
regions be granted such a right of participation and that 
they should draw up the regional development plans and 
conversion plans44 45, but Commission and Council both preferred 
a more cautious formula which is only a small step forward 
compared to the Regional Fund Regulation of 1984. It is also 
a retreat compared to the formulation used in the IMP 
Regulation where the regions were presented as having a 
"natural" competence to participate in the planning process- 
.46 As a gesture towards the regions, the Commission decided, 
around the same period, to create a Consultative Council of 
Regional and Local Authorities46.
Partnership is to be seen more as a political than as a 
legal formula. It denotes the objective of involving all 
possible actors in the planning and implementing process so 
as to maximise the political consensus and, hopefully, the 
economic efficiency of the development operations. While the 
term of partnership is new, the idea behind it had been 
experimented for the first time on full scale within the 
framework of the Intgerated Mediterranean Programmes.
Yet, the fact that Member States, regions and local 
authorities are no longer presented as "applicants" begging 
for money but as "partners" in the decision-making about 
their economic future, should not hide that the major change 
brought by the regulation to the power structure is, 
probably, to the benefit of the supranational partner, namely 
the Commission of the European Communities.
44 See the amendments to articles 4, 8 and 9 of the proposed 
"framework" Regulation, in European Parliament Doc A 2-58/88 of 
28 April 1988.
45 See, in this sense, Giuseppe Tesauro, "Partecipazione delle 
regioni alla formazione delle decisioni comunitarie", Rivista di 
Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale 1989, 11-26, at 21.





























































































* Role of the Commission
In the new rules governing regional development policy, the 
Commission has the major advantage of being relieved of a 
heavy burden: that of examining thousands and thousands of 
small projects. From now on, it will only have to scrutinise 
the global development plans, the programmes and some big 
projects. The detailed breakdown is left to the implementa­
tion stage.
This will allow the Commission to take a broader view of 
things and to use its limited staff for elaborating a 
deliberate strategy based on Community priorities. In 
implementing this strategy, the Commission will no longer be 
hindered by strict national quotas; instead, there is only an 
"indicative distribution" among countries of 85% of the ERDF 
budget. Its greater decision-making powers are supplemented 
by the possibility to control and monitor the implementation 
of the actions which it has approved. All in all, the 
Commission seems now to be able to exercise considerable, 
perhaps even excessive, powers in directing regional 
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